Polmar was then blasted by Admiral Harvey:
Admiral John C. Harvey Jr., U.S. Navy; Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command —After reading Mr. Polmar’s column, I felt compelled to correct a number of errors of fact and misperceptions contained in the piece, if only to minimize the confusion for the readers regarding authorities and responsibilities within our submarine force.
Although I disagree with many of the opinions Mr. Polmar espoused, I will limit my comments to matters of command-and-control. I discussed this topic extensively in my article “Course Corrections in Command and Control” in the March 2012 issue of Proceedings . While it would not be productive to repeat everything in that article, let me address a few major points about the leadership of the submarine force.
Mr. Polmar takes aim at the purportedly “convoluted command structure” in the submarine force. His discussion is simply inaccurate and without merit. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and I endeavored over the past three years to clarify lines of command-and-control for all forces, taking action to provide clear channels of authority and accountability from fleet commanders to individual units. As a result, the administrative-control relationships of Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic and Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet are very clear. Further, the role of Commander, Submarine Forces as a force commander is also clear, and the submarine force is executing these responsibilities very effectively.
As is the case with each of our warfare communities, the Chief of Naval Operations has a Director of Undersea Warfare (N97) who serves as the Navy’s resource sponsor (responsible for programming resources across the Future Years Defense Program) for our undersea-warfare programs. This is neither new nor unique to the submarine force, as N96 is the Director for Surface Warfare and N98 is the Director for Naval Aviation, with the same responsibilities within their respective warfare areas.
It appears, however, that Mr. Polmar’s primary criticism is reserved for the Director of Naval Reactors. Here again, his criticism is inaccurate. My responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces for the safe and effective operation and maintenance of the nuclear-powered warships assigned to my command are clear and unambiguous. I am accountable directly to the Chief of Naval Operations for every aspect of the performance of my fleet. However, because of the truly unique nature of nuclear propulsion and the very high standards for safety and operational effectiveness required, day in and day out, the Director of Naval Reactors has been afforded broad oversight responsibility for the details of research, design, construction, testing, operation, maintenance, and disposal of all Navy nuclear-propulsion plants since the inception of the program in 1948.
Currently, our Navy has 104 operational reactors (including submarines and aircraft carriers), and this year we will surpass 150 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power. Our success is due in large part to the director’s strong oversight and commitment to the highest standards of operations and safety. The Naval Reactors organization has been consistently recognized not only for its record of excellence, but also for its operational model, by business, academia, and government experts—both in the United States and abroad. I strongly disagree with Mr. Polmar’s criticisms of this organization that has achieved such a record of excellence, and continues to do so, and I believe his fundamental assertion of ambiguous authorities is factually incorrect.
However in the same issue Polmar gives SOSUS a plug:
Norman Polmar, author, Death of the Thresher—Mr. Butrovich disagrees “completely” with my statement that the initial event that caused the loss of the submarine USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the S5W reactor scram. He bases his views on his later experiences in the submarine Tinosa (SSN-606), which had been extensively modified and had new scram-recovery procedures. But he does not tell us what he believes was the initial event that sank the Thresher .
The last series of AN/UQC voice messages from the Thresher on 10 April 1963 began with “experiencing minor problem.” When I interviewed the first commanding officer of the Thresher in the summer of 1963, then-Captain Dean L. Axene stated that at test depth the only “problem” he would describe as “minor” would have been a reactor scram. Axene added that seawater flooding, even through a ½-inch pipe, would never be described as a minor problem. Several other submarine officers with whom I spoke while writing the book Death of the Thresher (1964) fully agreed with Axene.
Shortly after the loss of the Thresher , then–Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover held a meeting in Washington of his staff and submarine commanding officers for the purpose of revising and reducing the time for reactor-scram restarts.
Finally, the reactor-scram casualty theory is fully agreed to by Bruce Rule, in 1963 the analysis officer at the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) evaluation center at Norfolk and subsequently the lead acoustic analyst in the Office of Naval Intelligence for 42 years. On 3 July 2012, Rule wrote to the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion:
There is not now—nor was there in 1963—any evidence in the specific case of THRESHER to support the [court of inquiry] conclusion that the rupture of a silver-brazed, sea-connected pipe caused a reactor scram. THRESHER’s 0913 transmission to the [surface ship] SKYLARK—which made no mention of flooding—and analysis of the SOSUS acoustic data are consistent with failure of the non-vital electric bus which resulted in a reactor scram at test depth . . . Unable to deballast because of a subsequently confirmed ice-formation condition in the high-pressure air lines, THRESHER sank to collapse at extreme depth without any prior flooding. Both the pressure hull and all sea-connected systems survived well beyond design specifications.
Lots to read here and the posts. Lots of hashing to do. Great thread, Jim. thanks for posting.
Check this out:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19940049
Charlie