Posting 171 on History.Net; google History.Net SCORPION

Bruce Rule says
9/2/2011 at 2:04 pm

Those who have read my one-star Amazon.com review of Ed Offley’s SCORPION DOWN know that my assessment is that there are very serious credibility problems with Offley’s contention in his book that a student at the Navy ASW Training Center in Norfolk, VA in 1982, viewed a tape that purportedly recorded a Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) detection of an “underwater dogfight” between SCORPION and an ECHO-II Class Soviet nuclear submarine that sank SCORPION with a torpedo.

The Amazon.com review summarizes why, in my assessment, this tape could not have recorded a real event but was, instead, a composite of three separate (unrelated) detection events:

1. A US nuclear submarine
2. An ECHO-II Class Soviet nuclear submarine
3. A torpedo

Unfortunately, the tape has disappeared.

For background, the purported detection of the dogfight by SOSUS hydrophone arrays in the western Atlantic would have involved detection ranges at least as great as 976 nautical miles, the distance from the SCORPION wreck-site (32-55N, 33-09W) to the closest SOSUS array – designated 3141 – which terminated at Argentia, Newfoundland.

Earlier comments left on this HistoryNet.com thread state that the acoustic detection of SCORPION (on the tape) included a "bathtub effect." The term bathtub is SOSUS operator slang for the appearance of a Lloyds Mirror multi-acoustic-signal-path effect (interference pattern) on a SOSUS lofargram which is a time (y-axis) versus frequency (x-axis) plot of the low-frequency acoustic spectrum.

The Lloyds Mirror effect appears on a lofargram as a series of energy swaths separated by nulls, both of which gradually decrease in frequency as an acoustic target is detected approaching a sensor on a constant course. The nulls, which have a common (basic) spacing (separation) in frequency, are not multiples of a common frequency, i.e., they are not harmonically-related. They decrease in frequency until a target, maintaining a steady course, reaches the closest point of approach (CPA) to the sensor. The swaths and nulls then increase frequency/spacing as the target, still operating on a steady course, opens range to the sensor. Viewed over time, this pattern resembles a bathtub in that it has a frequency dip (the bottom of the "tub") at CPA. The swaths represent detection of broadband energy from the target. (Such energy is rarely detected from US nuclear submarines at ranges in excess of 5-10 nautical miles.)

If the depth of the acoustic sensor is known and the range to the target can be derived from a Doppler shift in the targets narrowband energy during CPA, then the spacing (in Hz) of the nulls (between the swaths) can be used to determine target depth.

Essentially all detections of Lloyds Mirror (bathtub) effects from US nuclear submarines involve ranges of less than 10 nautical miles because, as noted above, they require detection of broadband energy. Air-dropped acoustic sensors (sonobuoys) are the almost exclusive source of Lloyds Mirror detections of US nuclears and most of the involved ranges are significantly less 2-3 nautical miles, often in the hundreds of yards.

The statement in this thread that the SCORPION detection on the ASW Training School tape exhibited a bathtub effect establishes conclusively that the detection was NOT made by a SOSUS array at a range of one thousand nautical miles or more. Further, it is stated the acoustic sources that formed the bathtub were dropping in frequency. This could only have occurred if the target had been on a steady course and had significantly changed aspect relative to the sensor in a relatively short period of time, i.e., 10-20 minutes. Neither circumstance would be possible if the detection had occurred, as maintained by Offley, at ranges of 1000 nautical miles or more and had involved frequent course changes while involved in the purported underwater dogfight..

As concluded in the Amazon.com book review, the ASW Training School tape was a composite of separate detection events with the most probable source of the SCORPION (or other 585/588 Class hull) detection from a sonobuoy at a range not greater than several nautical miles.

Bottom line: the ASW Training School tape viewed in 1982 was a composite tape put together at the ASW Training School, probably for training purposes, but passed off to students – and one junior instructor as a real event. This conclusion further refutes the basic contention by Offley that a Soviet submarine sank SCORPION.

There was no SOSUS detection of an underwater dogfight between SCORPION and an ECHO-II Class Soviet nuclear submarine nor was there any effort by the Office of Naval Intelligence to confiscate and destroy any such detection. Fifteen analysts with a total of 400 years of SOSUS experience signed off on that conclusion.

SCORPION was lost because hydrogen produced by the main storage battery exploded at 18:20:44Z on 22 May 1968 instantly killing or incapacitating the entire crew. There was no one left to maintain depth-control. SCORPION slowly sank to a depth of 1530-feet where the pressure-hull collapsed at 18:42:34Z.

There was no Soviet involvement, no SOSUS detection of an underwater dogfight with a Soviet nuclear submarine, no SOSUS detection of a torpedo, no explosions external to the SCORPION pressure-hull, and no deus ex machina. There was only a terrible accident (the battery explosion) that occurred while SCORPION was transiting the east central North Atlantic toward its home-port of Norfolk.

- See more at: http://www.historynet.com/the-uss-scorpion-buried-at-sea.htm#sthash.yG9U2bVg.dpuf

Post Script: Somewhere - still living - there may be those individuals who put together the SCORPION "dogfight tape." It would still be useful if they came forward and acknowledged their complicity in this unfortunate incident which came back to haunt so many when the first SCORPION conspiracy novel was published circa 2006.

Bruce:
After all these years, I still get excited about what we did. I read with extreme interest the explanation of the "bath tub", and applaude your continued interest in such an important topic (Scorpion). Thanks for getting my SOSUS juices flowing again this morning. I can smell the ozone, hear the clatter of the TTYs in com, and sense the urgency as a Flash comes in. Thanks!
George

George:

Thank you for your response and thank you again for adding your years in the system to the Amazon.com review of
SCORPION DOWN by Ed Offley, a review all on this site should read because it addresses false statements about
SCORPION, the System and ONI.

I agree, for many of us time in the system was the time of our lives.

Best,

Bruce

Bruce,

Upon reviewing your analysis post script it occurred to me there were several locations with sufficient recording capability to merge multiple individual detections into a single beam display of sufficient realism to make it suitable for use in targeted training applications.

Both staffs in the 1970s-80S had extensive watch qualification (OQS) and target recognition programs which used display data for both individual test (qualification oral boards and injection drills) and system test (target detection, recognition, and reporting drills known as Foxtrot Relays). In the latter case a one hour segment of data was sent via SADR. That one hour segment might contain three shorter acoustic segments, typically in sequence which would present a variety of data to challenge the analysis skills of individual sites in real-time. Sites were graded on their analysis of the data for System E competition, and thus the site QA personnel would be augmented to validate the watches analysis of the relay. As a System Training LPO and a site QA Officer/LCPO I participated on both sides of the equation.

The Foxtrot Relay data segments were never intentionally combined to occupy the same temporal space, merging three channels containing seperate contacts into a single channel display, but might have been sequentially linked end-to-end to provide multiple targets within the same one hour formal drill relay. Similar processes were used to build ORI battle problem tapes for injection on to beams during ORI. Again, the developer's stipulation was to NOT acoustically merge multiple targets into a single "false" acoustic display channel since doing so violated every protocol for target detection, recognition, and analysis training.

Because these data drills were quite effective in upgrading the analytical skills of system personnel they were sent in analog tapes to each Naval Facility, Training Facility, and the A-school to broaden the analytical skills of new personnel in the community. That process, and the related OQS standard made the Oceansystems Technician Analyst one of the most proficient ratings that used LOFAR to perform their naval mission.

In my opinion, and that opinion is just based on my own experiences, one of the sequenced segments or Foxtrot segments, possibly contained a US Nuc, E-II, and Soviet torpedo detection. It took an instructor, who may have been kidding, to link the training data to the Scorpion tragedy. Then, it took a jerk to fail in his literary responsibilies to investigate, fact check, assume that such an event could have actually occurred without a major international incident, and been irresponsible enough to report it as truth.

Just my opinion, but I believe it may explain the acoustic data element of the event. Occam's razor applies...

Best,
Rick

I like that theory, Rick. "Photoshopping" with LOFAR! LOL

One of my projects for delivery to the RTF when it was established was the Ocean System Simulator (OSS). The acoustic data base used at the RTF was actual background acoustic data that we recorded from one of our sites (days and days worth of data) - via HDDR (High Density Digital Recorder).

The OSS provided for the injection of any additional recorded real (not synthetic) TOI into this background data base.

The merged background data base and TOI could again be recorded via HDDR.

Playback of this second HDDR tape would then have the original acoustic data base and injected real TOI acoustic data combined.

This procedure could be (and was) repeated numerous times thereby increasing the number of TOIs presented on the beams/array (school house environment).

It is easy to see how such a gram segment - with different TOIs on the same beam and time period could be produced. – Ed Smock

Ed,

In the 1972-1975 time period I worked for Gary Peterson in the Pacific System Training shop, and for George Widenor in System Readiness in support of Battle Problem development. During that period we implemented the formal Oral Board as a key element of the COSP OQS qualification standard. That also required that a formal standard for target plotting be created (a job that I took on since I loved correlation analysis as an element of the evaluation process). The Plotting Procedures Manual and George's lighted plotting table resulted in creating a new generation of super-plotters throughout the system.

During the baselining of that development George, Gary, Bob Hinshaw, Dan Martin, Bill Polk and I had lively discussions over lunch hour Double Pinochle games concerning the necessity to keep the acoustics pristine during tape development. It was someting that we all knew could "fog" the acoustics of a segment creating a false signature with conflicting acoustic elements that would "teach" the trainee or task the testee improperly. I was taught that by Bob VanAlstine while working as his Section TPO in Arg.

Van would have me inject drills on every watch, but would ensure that signatures that confused the picture by giving false analytical indicators be identified to the recipient once the detection and classification element of the injection had been satisfied. Bruce's mention of the Lloyd's mirror comes to mind. If such data was on a display that was injected multi-array located hundreds of miles away, I would give extra credit for an analyst that identifited the inconsistency in the data. If the analyst didn't recognize the inconsistency, I would identify it, explain why it couldn't be acoustically true, and ask that they disregard it.

It was that logic that defined the Training Tape/Battle Problem Tape protocols used as the early OQS was developed in the analog days. I attempted to incorporate them during the formal OQS Development Group in San Diego. DeWayne Taylor-Brown and I fought to get that rolled in to some formal criteria for Training Aids development, but it didn't make it into the end product. Those protocols were never formally documented during my tenure at COSP. (George, Gary, and I all had orders to Kef out of COSP, but I was asked to "volunteer" to help resolve a critical analysis/readiness shortfall on Midway and the orders were changed. My biggest regret was not being able to complete that tour at Kef.)

In looking back I consider it a shortfall that I didn't impress on enough people the critical need to "keep the data pristine." We know that a detection is a slice in time whose characteristics really should never be merged with other detection slices in the same temporal space. I knew it was important to teach the multi-contact evironment, but such requirements could have generated an effort to fulfill those requirements while maintaining acoustic integrity protocols. Signal simulators were developed as I recall that were not "realistic" enough for some but did succeed in adhering to the integrity protocol.

Best,

Rick

Rick, I totally agree with realistic training.

What is sad is the fact that a gathering of a group of dedicated people such as you/we had in the early days cannot be found anymore (except in N2). Now, it is only “the old-timers” that talk of “what it was like” and the “family” that we had and how we saw to it that it continued to grow.

The “family” has ceased to grow. Only a few of the new generation continue on to even a second tour with us. It is sad to say that “we have become sterile”.

However, we will not give up. There are some of us left that continue to try and change this downward trend. - Ed Smock.

Ed,
The problem is not unlike the situation facing a site who has lost critical skill levels of personnel. The site cannot recover without an infusion of skilled leadership and a selection of potentially future "stars" that are selected and provided special training and detailing to address the critical problem identified.

There must be examples from other ratings that have had similar problems with technical retention whose approach resolved the issue favorably. If not currently, then in the past.

I'd give anything to be in a position to help you create an approach that might work. Sadly, my situation is such that I don't do a lot of travel anymore. There is still a whole lot of talent out here who might enjoy one more swing at the plate to help restore the skills lost.

Rick

Rick - your offer of a possible theory for how the tape may have been fabricated seems to make sense. And I do recall how much of an effort we put into creating realistic dubs. Never, ever, just "blast it in", where a distinct and abrupt change in background noise would be a dead give-away. I always believed that coordination between prior intelligence, well-developed plots and searches and what to anticipate (acoustically) provided the best opportunity to accurately evaluate a watch team. You could learn almost as much about the section before the "play" button was pressed than after the IC was discovered (sometimes a lot more, actually). With that in mind, the quality (and realism) of our ORI tapes became better and better as we used prior inspection cycles as a baseline for improvement.

You, Bill Polk, Bob Henshaw, Dan Martin, and Gary Peterson were like artists with a blank canvass. The seven channels of acoustic data, once "in the can", were a like a "treasure awaiting discovery". I loved that part of our career.

I sometimes forget that you were diverted to a site that sorely needed your help, resulting in you missing the best 3 years of Kef's long and storied existence. I can only imagine how much better April of 1977 would have been if I had the pleasure of touring the beams during watch turnover with you.

Thanks for the stroll down memory lane

The Golden Age was indeed golden. When I got to Midway I teamed up with Gary Morgan and the new CO, Butch Moldenhauer (P3 Jockey), and we took her back to basics. Long hours, lots of teaching, testing, drills, and team building resulted in Midway winning Most Improved when DeWayne Talor-Brown's Team inspected a year later. Morale and team building is so important in turning a negative situation to positive. A young OTA3 Denny Harrington was the plotter in my section in the beginning, and later when I took over the QA shop he took that section forward. He was destined for great things in SOSUS, even back then.

We lived and worked during a great time with great people. What more could we ask?

Best,

Rick

My initiation as a CPO was the second most emotional event that I had while serving in the Navy. The first time I was assigned as a roving Supervisor to watch over 31 and 41 and I discovered my first reportable, one of ours. I attempted to call over the PA system, "George to 31". Nothing came out. My throat was dry and I could not understand why I couldn't speak at first. I actually felt sick to my stomach for a moment. You see someone had provided discipline, leadership, trained me, instilled pride in the job, responsibility for errors, importance of mission, and believed in me to do the best job I could and then some, and always, always train my relief. He also persuaded me to re-enlist and make the Job and Navy a Career.
Argentia, NFLD, 1966-1970. Thank You George. Say Hi to Peg for Linda and I.
OTAC USN RET
Chuck Cable

Rick:

You are right on the mark; once a site lost what you correctly call “critical skill levels,” the site could not self-recover. As you state, recovery required the “infusion” of talent from elsewhere; however, in some cases, it was much worse than just one station going under operationally; it could be an entire system that was degraded.

In the late 60's or early 70s, it became apparent from events that occurred further down the road that Adak was not fulfilling its function. CNO Op-095, VADM Charlie Martell, directed me to go to Adak as a “trouble-shooter” to identify the problem and recommend solutions.

Upon arrival, I went into the keep-quiet and observe mode for three days, often arriving on the mid-watch to talk to those who “pounded the mats.” Unable to locate the plot, I concluded they might have “compartmentalized” it and I was not automatically allowed access, despite being the CNO rep.

Finally, after three days, I asked about the plot and was told that, in respond to being “jigged” during an ORI because the use of half-inch thick plastic over the plot created unacceptable parallax, they had gotten rid of the plot. Basically, no one could DR anything further down the road and set up searches.

That circumstance, in combination with reduced skill levels and motivation, and a complete lack of any historical perspective explained why the gate-keeper appeared to be asleep at critical times.

After three weeks and a final discussion with the Ops Officer and the CO, I departed for Pearl to brief the Commodore; however, I promise to send back copies of NAVSTIC analyses of Adak events of great historical and operational value that demonstrated system capabilities none of the current crew was aware of. Some of those events had occurred as early as 16 Sep 1963.

I was not looking forward to the brief at Pearl until I realized all I had to tell the Commodore was that Adak was not following COSP operational directives. Back in DC, I wrote a 35-page report for Op-095 who sent it to all sites with the name of the involved site blacked out but since Adak was the only site name with four letters, there was not much mystery.

So, what happened? Well, the Ops Officer was “fired,” the only time I've ever heard that term used for a System Officer. Later, I learned that the reports of past events sent as promised had been destroyed upon arrival because the data was considered too old to be useful. Although my trip was not a compete waste of time, the long term effects were negligible.

There was another recommendation that – based on the inevitable comparison with Kef – was a bad joke. I pointed out that when commissioned, the Kef CO, XO and Ops officers had a total system experience – as I remember – of 26 years while the then current Adak equivalents that a total of one year. What did BuPers do? Big surprise; they “Adaked” Kef. The argument that you would never assign a CO, XO or Ops officers to a ship with no previous at-sea experience meant noting to BuPers.

Oh, so long ago.

Bruce

Bruce,
Just wanted you to know that your trouble-shooting visit to Adak did accomplish something. When I arrived in Nov. 1973 there was definitely a plotting table in the center of the room right next to the Watch Officer and Supervisor's desks! I definitely made use of it as a plotter during my year on Adak. Thanks for your improvements to the system.

Rick:

Thank you for your cogent observations and useful suggestions.

With reference to the first SCORPION conspiracy book, it appears the author had, for years, harbored the delusion that the Soviets were involved. He selected only those “facts” that supported his theory. Fact checking may have been beyond his ken. I am sure your assessment of how the tape fiasco became airborne is accurate.

The author of the “bath tub” discussion, self-identified on the History.net site, as Vince Collier, also provided the statement in the book that the ECHO-II was in “split-plant” propulsion mode; nice trick for an ECHO-II to detect, track and successfully attack a near 30-knot US nuclear submarine while restricted to speeds below 14 knots in that propulsion mode.

I remember well the Foxtrot Relays; it was a great concept; brought the “threat” home to many sites otherwise unlikely to have that experience. For whatever use seems appropriate, I have provided CUS with a CD copy of the Canary Island hydrophone A detections of the SCORPION acoustics.

The problem with merging data from multiple sites - at least for SCORPION - is that the Canary Island data, despite being a singe phone and altered by bathymetry, was significantly more detectable at a range of 821 nm than 3141 was at a range of 976 nm. In fact, the extremely weak 3141 signals – and the even weaker 3131 signals at 1021 nm – would not have been identified without the Canary Island data. The mid-Atlantic Ridge almost totally “eclipsed” the SCORPION signals at Argentia. My SCORPION book discusses these detections in great detail. Email me your snail mail address and I'll send you a copy.

Best,

Bruce