First, I have to say that the topics Bruce has brought to this forum are outstanding and most welcome. I hope he continues to bring us more of these great articles.

I have a somewhat different take on Reagan and the 600 ship Navy. At the time this plan was announced the Navy was at a ship strength of 538 ships. A build up was planned to increase force levels to 15 Carrier battle groups. The aim of the plan was specifically to make up for the reductions as a result of our Vietnam involvement and what we felt were our world-wide obligations. The Reagan adiminstration chose a plan which was estimated to cost over $80 billion in 1983 dollars yet it would not reach the goal they desired of 600 ships. Given that this information was public knowledge I believe the Soviets were aware that this could not be achieved.

I was in the J2 at USEUCOM when the Berlin wall fell and the other European satellites were restored or subsequently split, i.e., Czecheslovakia became The Czech Republic and Slovakia. Based on what I saw and completed in my own research I believe the Soviets fell for purely economic reasons that had their genesis at the end of WWII. The Russians wanted the satellite countries to be a buffer from the west. They were estremely paranoid of an invasion such as they suffered in WWII. As such, they supported the growth of the militaries of these countries and their own which necessitated a large effort on the part of their industry to support these aims. Plus, Gorbachev was, in my view, the first Russian leader who saw that the old ways were no longer viable and worked to overcome them. Over time, the failure of their economic plans and success of ours, the preceived threat from other US presidential administrations plus our allies, and Gorbachev's efforts, eventually bankrupted the Soviet Union.

My point is that the fall of the Soviet Union was cumulative. From Truman to Reagan, all administrations, our capitalistc society, and our European allies put the bullet into communisum. Too many ascribe the Soviets fall to Reagan and doing so they ignore the impacts of all those who came before them.

All great contributions for the economic fall, however some years after I left the Navy and SOSUS program, I was stationed (Civil Service) at the Surface Ship ASW Analysis Center, SSAAC SITE in Mayport, FL. Soviet War ships pulled into port and docked right next our water front building. The Base took bus loads of sailors/Enlisted and Officer alike to the local grocery, & department stores. At first they were not sure if these places were just a set up and that we, Americans did not really have all these choices and abundance in the stores. My point here "If the people" of a suppressed country start to find out that they have been feed BS all their life that is when things must change, or else. Certainly trying to out spend the US was foolish, and maybe the some of the political leaders in the USSR at the time saw the people becoming more and more unsettled. I hope everyday for the people of North Korea to get the will and support to change their miserable lives.
Just a thought, People Power!!!!!!!!
Chuck

Chuck,

Your post was a good one and has a lot of merit. That thought is shared by a lot of people.

In the late 80s, I was part of a "think tank" to try to map strategy of where the R&D world should put their effort (Money). The Key Note speaker was Tom Clancy and during his talk, he paused and posed the question as to what brought down the Soviet Union. After a number of elaborate spiels by some of the Super Thinkers, Clancey gave his thoughts which mirrored your post.

He said and I paraphrase, that when global communications began to shrink the world, the "have not" began to get glimpses of supermarkets with full shelves, folks with two cars in a brick home with a two car garage, etc., etc.

It was his opinion that the (using your phrase) "Power of the People" contributed as much to their downfall as anything else.

Interesting talk he gave!!!

JE

Thank you collectively for your thoughtful responses to the posting on the impact of SOSUS on the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. The following comments are provided:

To John: I agree with your assessment that President Reagan, et al properly assessed that the Soviets would continue to try to match the U.S. In strategic naval weapons platforms, e.g., SSBNs. Page 240 of RSNF states that between 1960 and 1967, the U.S. Navy acquired 41 Polaris submarines while on page 242 it states the Soviets acquired 56 SSBNs from 1967 to 1977, an example of the then-existing Soviet mindset: successfully compete at all cost.

With respect to how aware the U.S. Intelligence Community was of the pending economic collapse of the Soviet Union, the following is provided relative to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

In the 1980s, one of the standard briefs I gave to Navy activities concerned with the design of future passive ASW systems involved projections of the Soviet submarine Order of Battle (OB) and the detectability of those platforms. In other words, how many SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs the Soviets would have operational in the future – at five year intervals - and their estimated narrowband and broadband noise levels. Perforce, those projections required estimates of building rates for new classes and retirement rates for existing classes. Other departments at ONI provided the estimated OB figures while the ACINT department provided the noise level assessments.

Toward the end of the 1980s, with no information other than what was in the public domain, I became skeptical of the OB data I was being given which rather mindlessly assumed new classes of Soviet SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs as a sort of “natural order,” based on what the Soviets had previously done. Those projections went beyond 2000 with only slight reductions in total submarine OB numbers.

It got to the point where I would preface my briefs by saying that although I had reasonable confidence in the acoustic projections, I had significantly less confidence in the OB numbers. Upper management knew what I was briefing and said nothing.

Meanwhile, others at ONI continued to brief the projected OB numbers to non-ACINT consumers. As I remember, the OB brief was being given – possibly at DIA – with all the usual robust post 2000 submarine OB numbers when the briefer was interrupted by the following question: “What Navy are you talking about?” When the ONI briefer reportedly responded: “The Soviet Navy,” the questioner said: “In 2000 the Soviets won't have a Navy.” He was certainly closer to the mark than the briefer. So, while other activities may have had a handle on what the Soviet submarine OB would look like in the “out-years,” ONI was making projections that appear not to have considered the economic “Sword of Damocles” then obviously hanging over the Soviet Union.

I also agree with your comment about the “twisted fate” of the Walker business. I have often wondered what happened to those Soviet designers and engineers who had assured their Navy bosses that the submarines they were building would be extremely difficult to for the U.S. to detect while - at the same time - the Walker data showed how few of those platforms would survive at sea in a hostile environment. There must have been at least some who went on long vacations to a Gulag.

So, the effort to effectively replace everything built before the later VICTOR IIIs, and the cost of that noise reduction program – given a national priority by the Walker information - was one of many reasons the Soviet economy went belly up. I believe that in the early 1980s, there was one year where the Soviets deployed slightly more submarines than there were days in the year; of course, that included multiple FOXTROTs to the Med. Compare that with what may have been a single submarine deployment about 10 years later – and that by a KILO to an arms show in the UK in an effort to gain foreign sales.

To Scott: I agree that at least some in the Soviet Union were aware early-on that they could not match the U.S. goal of a 600 ship Navy. I also agree with your conclusion that generations of Soviet leadership did not know - or would not acknowledge – until Gorbachev – that the Soviet Union was heading for bankruptcy – and had been for all those generations. Can you imagine what would have happened to anyone who told Stalin not to arm against what was considered to be the massive threat posed by the U.S.?

A classic example of such improvident expenditures occurred between 1947 and 1952 when the Soviets essentially copied three captured U.S. B-29 bombers as the basis for their TU-4 (Bull) bomber and built 847 planes. Page 166 of RSNF states that these U.S. B-29s were captured in the Far East and were moved to Moscow in June-July 1945, months before Japan surrendered; fine allies.

As you state, the economic impact was cumulative over a 45 year period, and it probable took that long because the Soviets were “parasitic” upon the economies of their Eastern European “allies,” who were unwilling (captive) consumers of inferior Soviet products.

To Chuck: reference your description of a visit by Soviet naval personnel to a U.S. grocery, if I remember correctly, a similar event occurred in Sep 1959 when Nikita Khrushchev visited a supermarket (in San Francisco?) and accused his hosts of a put-up job because he could not believe the variety of food stuffs available to the public.

Best to all,

Bruce

Bruce,

Your comments and insight are always interesting and always seem to spark another question.

Now, before I ask this question, it is by no means directed at any one person employed by ONI. As I told you in my personal email to you, I did a lot of work for the agency and the men and women that I mentioned in that email have my total respect.

Now the question. Did you ever get the feeling that ONI was, on occasion, used as a tool, specifically a budgetary tool for the Navy and/or defense department? Your comments on the briefings that included OB projections for the Soviet Navy is sort of an example of my thoughts. If the analysts were suspect of the OB numbers being briefed, I just feel like some of the upper echelon folks had to be aware also. I, on occasion, felt that some of the data projections coming out of ONI were somewhat biased as a means of protecting the Navy budget.

Another example where I had suspicions was the acoustic source level data base. I had some apprehension regarding the estimated source levels for some acoustic sources, especially the Very Very Low Frequency sources. In the late 80s, some fellow NRLers and I conducted a sea test for the express purpose of determining just how accurately we could measure those low frequencies. Even though we were in a very well known and described acoustic environment, We didn't have a lot of success primarily due to the lower limits of the acoustic receivers. We had modified some AN/SQQ 57 sonobuoys to try and reduce the self noise in the VLF spectrum but even with those modifications, coupled with a well known acoustic environment, I have to admit that our resulting measurements were a "good guess". My fears were compounded by a string of successes by PATWING 10 against both the Charlie and the Victor. The environment in which the Subs were operating coupled with the published Source level of the detected sources just did not add up. ( as far as I'm going in an unclassified forum).

So again, my question is a friendly and hopefully non-offensive query to get your thought on the ONI being occasionally used as a budgetary pawn specifically in the areas of OB projections and Source Level Estimates???

John

John:

A most interesting question which I hope I accurately summarize as: did ONI knowingly publish estimates of Soviet submarine radiated noise levels that were too low to support threat assessments that protected Navy budgets for advanced detection systems and associated platforms?

To the best of my knowledge, the answer is “no;” however, the effect may have been the same because of a mindset that ONI analysis assets had to, in the 60s and 70s, be directed toward exploiting data collected by “politically correct” passive acoustic systems, i.e., submarine-collected data. This was the case because those who allocated the assets were either submarine officers or those who knew where the money came from. In that context, SOSUS and even air-collected data were “orphans.” i.e., had, respectively, no or few advocates within ONI.

When George Miller and I were hired by ONI in October 1963, we thought we would be the tyros among the real experts. The shock came after about six months when we discovered that regardless of how little we knew, we knew more than anyone at ONI about acoustic signatures, especially the low-end.

In his book about the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Olav Riste discusses how unsatisfied NIS was with USN support of Project BRIDGE. I had to fight for every trip I made to Norway. I was always asked why I should go there when there was “better” submarine-collected data already in-house?

Almost all those already in-house data were missing the critical low end. It was a very long and unpleasant battle with ONI management made even worse when George Miller produced the first breakthrough assessment on Type 1s: S11 was not S11. ONI management simply didn't want to believe that such information was credible or that it could be derived from SOSUS data. Not until VADM Charles Martell became the “ASW Czar” as Op-095 did SOSUS have an real advocate. Occasionally, we went through the back-door and had Op-095 tell ONI what to do.

Getting back on track, the level estimates published from the 60s probably well into the 70s and perhaps even beyond were derived primarily from collection systems that did not have the capability to collect the “best” data.

George spear-headed an effort to “calibrate” two forward area arrays and have the measurement capability installed.
Without extensive on-site ONI support, this capability withered on the vine. It was another case of allocating assets elsewhere compounded by the fact that those at ONI who were making the measurements were not signature analysts; they basically were technicians measuring signal levels and had been weened on submarine data. We had to tell them what they were measuring and why and under what circumstances it was important.

It also should be remembered that the Navy then (60s-70s) was paranoid about the possibility the Soviets would produce a “quiet” nuclear submarine. No one wanted to read “reports” that discussed obnoxious targets – and that's where, if anywhere, the “slant” you refer to may have come into play. Plus, of course, if you didn't have the low-end, you were missing the boat, literally.

So, while many were – if not advocating the possibility of quiet first- and second-generation Soviet nucs – they were not dismissing it. Meanwhile Barbados had detected a NOVEMBER at 3000 nm in July 1962 and, within the next two years, both BRIDGE and ADAK added to the feast; however, these were not “calibrated” systems and; hence, their data could not be an input to ONI estimates of threat radiated noise levels. This myopic view held sway and resulted in the assessments you found (operationally) to be inaccurate.

With respect to the inflated OB numbers, I never thought those estimates were intentionally high. I concluded those who produced them were “divorced” from reality. Basically, they only considered information that came through the door with a classification stamped on it, i.e., if it was open-source material, it wasn't worth considering. Again, not intentional but the effect was the same and the result was consistent with continued budget support. You might say they took the easy road, the one with the fewest "bumps."

Hope this background helps.

Bruce

Bruce,

Thanks for the well written response. My questions were answered fully and I believe you are correct in your assessments. I appreciate your responding to the questions in the spirit in which the questions were asked!!!

The sources and respective Very Low Frequencies of interest were "difficult at best" to measure with sophisticated equipment, complicated by an incomplete understanding of the environment in which the measurements were taken. We grew up thinking Deep Sound Channel Axis and in the early days of higher frequencies, that was an OK thought train. But when we moved down in the spectrum where the real story was, it brought a whole new set of environmental issues and effects to bear on the problem. It was well into the 90s before the acousticians developed a full field TL model that would accurately account for the added environmental effects. When that model came along, we reran some of our earlier measurements and arrived at a totally different set of solutions, solutions that, to an extent, helped explain some of the earlier "operational" inconsistencies.

If I look at the system issues over a ~60 year period, It becomes evident that the "job" was done about as well as possible with the tools available at the time. I guess it's easy to second guess issues and decisions of the 60s/70s/80s with the information and tools available today.

Thanks again for your thoughtful and informative reply.

JE

Bruce&John: not a bad exchange of information for a couple of old senile farts. I guess your minds are not that far gone as yet. EKD

EKD:

As John has said, how did we miss making contact over so many years?

Oh well, we have now and its has been rewarding.

Among the really old farts, I think I outrank Ed and E-III by several months
in age but no one outranks Ed in length of service and he continues to stretch
his lead.

I assume that under no circumstances would ONI hire me back as a consultant.
OPNAV N97 would stand on the sidelines and cheer that decision as would
Naval Reactors; however, that has not stopped me from dropping hot coals
in their pants.

What I consider to have been some of my most productive analysis efforts
(K-129, MIKE, SCORPION and THRESHER) have been undertaken and completed
since my employment by ONI as a consultant ended in 2007. They wanted me
to work non-submarine platforms and I lost interest, very rapidly.

The K-129 analysis was particularly rewarding because the Navy - not having
any concept of what could be derived - even in 1968 - from analysis of the
AFTAC data, compartmentalized it so that NO ONE ever had a chance to look
at it until 2008, 40 years late.

That analysis was not difficult; any of half a dozen analysts then at ONI and
doubtless others elsewhere could have derived the assessment that two missiles
fired to fuel exhaustion within their closed launch tubes.

When you have two events with durations of 95.2 and 95.4 seconds separated
by six mins and one second, and which started at precisely 12:00:00Z, what
else could it have been?

Had NSA known that the crypto gear and key lists had been subjected to 5000
degree (F) missile exhaust for more than three mins total, that agency might
not have come down in favor of the AZORIAN recovery effort and the project
might never have been approved.

Still, AZORIAN was an incredible demonstration of technology and engendered
fear in the Soviets who came to understand that the US could and would do
things just because they were neat to do which made predicting such efforts
almost impossible.

It also has been enjoyable debunking those garbage conspiracy novels about
the K-129 and SCORPION.

Bruce

EKD,

I received a personal e-mail from Chuck Cable that read " Holy Crap on a Cracker, you're in your 70s"!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I certainly didn't need a reminder of that fact.

Bruce's postings have (to paraphrase George Widenor) sparked brain cells that have been dormant for some period of time!!!!!! It has been a fun month or so reading Bruce's posts. But........... don't expect a lot more from me because I think I "shot my wad" all at one time.

Thanks for the "old Timers" reminder. I owe you one and when you least expect it..........................!!!! :)

JE

John:

I too have just about "shot my wad," at least my unclassified wad.
Sadly, the really fascinating stuff will go when we go and the current
work force will never have the benefit of that unique information
which could be of great value sometime down the line.

My weirdest item involves the Kara Sea but that's about all I can say.

Bruce

I haven't been on here much lately and got way too far behind the power curve to read and comprehend all these posts. Nevertheless, I must comment:


I once saw a Yankee on 1107, but it was over somebody's shoulder.


Powerful reading guys, well done!

Randy

Bruce, Randy,

It's also fun to try to write and non-operational response when the men in question are deemed worthy of the effort.

Bruce, I have a feeling you havn't even scratched the surface. CMON, I took qualification exams in the mid 60s when your name was the answer to at least one of the questions, maybe more. My sense is that things you might consider routine would be fascinating to the average bloke. Give it your best shot Bruce. A lot of us are hanging on every word!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

And Randy, your biggest asset has always been not acknowledging what you both accomplished and contributed. "A Yankee over someones shoulder" is a cute quote. You saw more at Kef in a year than most of us saw in a lifetime. That, in my opinion, is why its so important for Bruce to continue his history lessons. Not all of us got to stand a watch in Kef. But............, the majority of us gave it our best shot regardless of our duty assignment. Every time Bruce writes a post, something clicks in the mind of a watchstander at Ramey or Nantucket or Shelburne, a click that explains what it was all about as a System............., not just a NAVFAC but a system. So, keep em coming Bruce. We'll each chime in when we think we have something to add.

JE

John, as always you are way too kind to me. Your posts on here left me scratchin' my head and wondering where I missed all that stuff in OQS :)
If the string continues I'll try to contribute, really interesting stuff! BTW, I retired in May and lasted 2 months before I got a part time job...hard to breal old habits.

R~