IUSSCAA Message Board


UNCLASSIFIED, NON-POLITICAL, and  NON-SENSITIVE POSTS ONLY
IUSSCAA Posting Guidelines


IUSSCAA Wallpapers
Ocean Night 1280x1024 1024X768 800X600
Mid-Watch   1280x1024 1024X768 800X600



IUSSCAA Message Board
Start a New Topic 
Author
Comment
SECRET CNO Memo to Flag Officers. Subj: SOSUS Detections 21-26 Feb 1958

See link or go to http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb275/03.PDF

COMMENTS:

It is highly unlikely any of the contacts discussed in the CNO memo were valid.

In 1958, the only submarines the Soviets had that could have deployed to WESTLANT were ZULUs and they would have had support from AGIs operating close enough to provide emergency aid if required. The memo makes no mention of any AGI activity.

As already discussed in archived commentaries, 1958 was well within that period accurately described as the 'Acoustic Dark Ages.” No one had any idea what snorkel-mode signatures would look like – and did not until the Cuban Missile Crisis in Oct 1962. The CNO memo acknowledges this primitive state of knowledge by saying “the SOSUS art is in its infancy.”

In 1958, the System false alarm rate was enormous. Contacts were often classified “XNAS” (Unknown Non-American Submarine) if they did no fit any known alternate classification category, i.e., by exclusion rather than by inclusion in defined submarine signature categories.

Circa 1965, I went through all the Data Processing Unit (DPU) files still held by ONI.There were no valid signatures from 1958.

“Observers” often watched Soviet ASW forces thrash around the Barents Sea in the 1960-70s generating false contacts and further “inflaming” the local ASW picture. We had a similar period of imaginary submarine contacts including the infamous 240 hour “hold-down” of a FOXTROT in the Med. It turned out our DD's were tracked bottom features at speeds below two knots – they appear not to have factored in the effects of current.

Ed Smock: any comments?

Re: SECRET CNO Memo to Flag Officers. Subj: SOSUS Detections 21-26 Feb 1958

The last full page of the SOSUS portion of this memo is insightful. We learned the same lessons, and drew the same conclusions from these events as we would have if they had been real. Tactics, fleet reactions, communication difficulties, etc. Strange that even in our infancy, we seemed to be heading in the right direction. Turning our naivety into meaningful adjustments to operational planning? Comments please.........

Re: SECRET CNO Memo to Flag Officers. Subj: SOSUS Detections 21-26 Feb 1958

Thanks you for sharing this declassified Memo, Bruce. Interesting to note the relative importance big Navy placed on the SOSUS system so early in it's development.

Visits: