An individual in whom I have the utmost professional confidence wrote the following: “I was present at Hatteras during the 1958 time you mentioned in your msg on IUSSCAA web site.   There were a number of targets classified as xnas based on some photos in a DPU study....However,  as I remember, they all were trawlers or other small craft in the vicinity of the Hatteras arrays.”

George Widenor. Concur your comments. Same thing occurred in late 1965 with the first WESTLANT deployment of a NOVEMBER. We learned an enormous amout about reporting procedures and how quickly reporting everything could saturate the comms/analysis processes.

Jim Donovan:: As a WO and Analysis Officer at COSL 1961-1963, I never saw “the relative importance big Navy placed on the SOSUS system so early in it's development” until after I got to ONI in Oct 63. All that was apparent at the working level in Norfolk was hostility from SUBLANT – often the result of reporting activities by US nucs, especially the transatlantic detection of the GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN 598) by BARBADOS and ANTIGUA. As I have previously commented, we got “chewed-out” when we didn't detect a US nuc operation and chewed-out when we did and reported it. Absolutely a “no-win” situation. COMASWFORLANT's myoptic view on System expansion didn't help: that ADM saying: “What I need is an integrated system, not a burglar alarm.” As also previously stated, a sad perspective, especially at a time when no one had any idea what the burglar looked like. If we had had had before 1962 the burglar alarms we had after 1962, the System would have performed better - and such earlier - than it did during the Cuban Missile Crisis.