Rick - your offer of a possible theory for how the tape may have been fabricated seems to make sense. And I do recall how much of an effort we put into creating realistic dubs. Never, ever, just "blast it in", where a distinct and abrupt change in background noise would be a dead give-away. I always believed that coordination between prior intelligence, well-developed plots and searches and what to anticipate (acoustically) provided the best opportunity to accurately evaluate a watch team. You could learn almost as much about the section before the "play" button was pressed than after the IC was discovered (sometimes a lot more, actually). With that in mind, the quality (and realism) of our ORI tapes became better and better as we used prior inspection cycles as a baseline for improvement.
You, Bill Polk, Bob Henshaw, Dan Martin, and Gary Peterson were like artists with a blank canvass. The seven channels of acoustic data, once "in the can", were a like a "treasure awaiting discovery". I loved that part of our career.
I sometimes forget that you were diverted to a site that sorely needed your help, resulting in you missing the best 3 years of Kef's long and storied existence. I can only imagine how much better April of 1977 would have been if I had the pleasure of touring the beams during watch turnover with you.
Thanks for the stroll down memory lane
The Golden Age was indeed golden. When I got to Midway I teamed up with Gary Morgan and the new CO, Butch Moldenhauer (P3 Jockey), and we took her back to basics. Long hours, lots of teaching, testing, drills, and team building resulted in Midway winning Most Improved when DeWayne Talor-Brown's Team inspected a year later. Morale and team building is so important in turning a negative situation to positive. A young OTA3 Denny Harrington was the plotter in my section in the beginning, and later when I took over the QA shop he took that section forward. He was destined for great things in SOSUS, even back then.
We lived and worked during a great time with great people. What more could we ask?
Best,
Rick
My initiation as a CPO was the second most emotional event that I had while serving in the Navy. The first time I was assigned as a roving Supervisor to watch over 31 and 41 and I discovered my first reportable, one of ours. I attempted to call over the PA system, "George to 31". Nothing came out. My throat was dry and I could not understand why I couldn't speak at first. I actually felt sick to my stomach for a moment. You see someone had provided discipline, leadership, trained me, instilled pride in the job, responsibility for errors, importance of mission, and believed in me to do the best job I could and then some, and always, always train my relief. He also persuaded me to re-enlist and make the Job and Navy a Career.
Argentia, NFLD, 1966-1970. Thank You George. Say Hi to Peg for Linda and I.
OTAC USN RET
Chuck Cable
Rick:
You are right on the mark; once a site lost what you correctly call “critical skill levels,” the site could not self-recover. As you state, recovery required the “infusion” of talent from elsewhere; however, in some cases, it was much worse than just one station going under operationally; it could be an entire system that was degraded.
In the late 60's or early 70s, it became apparent from events that occurred further down the road that Adak was not fulfilling its function. CNO Op-095, VADM Charlie Martell, directed me to go to Adak as a “trouble-shooter” to identify the problem and recommend solutions.
Upon arrival, I went into the keep-quiet and observe mode for three days, often arriving on the mid-watch to talk to those who “pounded the mats.” Unable to locate the plot, I concluded they might have “compartmentalized” it and I was not automatically allowed access, despite being the CNO rep.
Finally, after three days, I asked about the plot and was told that, in respond to being “jigged” during an ORI because the use of half-inch thick plastic over the plot created unacceptable parallax, they had gotten rid of the plot. Basically, no one could DR anything further down the road and set up searches.
That circumstance, in combination with reduced skill levels and motivation, and a complete lack of any historical perspective explained why the gate-keeper appeared to be asleep at critical times.
After three weeks and a final discussion with the Ops Officer and the CO, I departed for Pearl to brief the Commodore; however, I promise to send back copies of NAVSTIC analyses of Adak events of great historical and operational value that demonstrated system capabilities none of the current crew was aware of. Some of those events had occurred as early as 16 Sep 1963.
I was not looking forward to the brief at Pearl until I realized all I had to tell the Commodore was that Adak was not following COSP operational directives. Back in DC, I wrote a 35-page report for Op-095 who sent it to all sites with the name of the involved site blacked out but since Adak was the only site name with four letters, there was not much mystery.
So, what happened? Well, the Ops Officer was “fired,” the only time I've ever heard that term used for a System Officer. Later, I learned that the reports of past events sent as promised had been destroyed upon arrival because the data was considered too old to be useful. Although my trip was not a compete waste of time, the long term effects were negligible.
There was another recommendation that – based on the inevitable comparison with Kef – was a bad joke. I pointed out that when commissioned, the Kef CO, XO and Ops officers had a total system experience – as I remember – of 26 years while the then current Adak equivalents that a total of one year. What did BuPers do? Big surprise; they “Adaked” Kef. The argument that you would never assign a CO, XO or Ops officers to a ship with no previous at-sea experience meant noting to BuPers.
Oh, so long ago.
Bruce
Bruce,
Just wanted you to know that your trouble-shooting visit to Adak did accomplish something. When I arrived in Nov. 1973 there was definitely a plotting table in the center of the room right next to the Watch Officer and Supervisor's desks! I definitely made use of it as a plotter during my year on Adak. Thanks for your improvements to the system. 
Rick:
Thank you for your cogent observations and useful suggestions.
With reference to the first SCORPION conspiracy book, it appears the author had, for years, harbored the delusion that the Soviets were involved. He selected only those “facts” that supported his theory. Fact checking may have been beyond his ken. I am sure your assessment of how the tape fiasco became airborne is accurate.
The author of the “bath tub” discussion, self-identified on the History.net site, as Vince Collier, also provided the statement in the book that the ECHO-II was in “split-plant” propulsion mode; nice trick for an ECHO-II to detect, track and successfully attack a near 30-knot US nuclear submarine while restricted to speeds below 14 knots in that propulsion mode.
I remember well the Foxtrot Relays; it was a great concept; brought the “threat” home to many sites otherwise unlikely to have that experience. For whatever use seems appropriate, I have provided CUS with a CD copy of the Canary Island hydrophone A detections of the SCORPION acoustics.
The problem with merging data from multiple sites - at least for SCORPION - is that the Canary Island data, despite being a singe phone and altered by bathymetry, was significantly more detectable at a range of 821 nm than 3141 was at a range of 976 nm. In fact, the extremely weak 3141 signals – and the even weaker 3131 signals at 1021 nm – would not have been identified without the Canary Island data. The mid-Atlantic Ridge almost totally “eclipsed” the SCORPION signals at Argentia. My SCORPION book discusses these detections in great detail. Email me your snail mail address and I'll send you a copy.
Best,
Bruce